Using high frequency data, we develop an event study method to test for level shifts in beta and measure abnormal returns for events that produce such level shifts. Using this method, we estimate abnormal returns for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) announcement and …nd that its abnormal returns are largely realized on the …rst day. The abnormal returns in the remaining post event period, which show up as a drift using standard methodology, are attributed to level shifts in beta.
Introduction
Measuring the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of an asset post the announcement of an event is the focus of a substantial body of literature in the …elds of economics, …nance, accounting, management, marketing and law; see MacKinlay (1997) . The vast majority of CARs are computed using what is termed the 'market model,' which is motivated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) . Generalizations of this market model are also sometimes used, as motivated, for instance, by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Model parameter estimates are critical to the determination of CARs, with model estimation typically based on pre-event daily returns over a year; see for example, Masulis et al. (2007) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) .
In event studies where signi…cant abnormal returns are detected many days after the event, changes in an asset's sensitivity to the overall market (as well as to other, potential, sources of systematic risk) are often suggested as an explanation of the perceived under-reaction or overreaction in stock returns. However, prior empirical studies have typically found that controlling for changes in systematic risk does not signi…cantly impact CAR estimates. In contrast, this paper demonstrates that controlling for systematic risk using an estimator well suited to detect changes in betas around events in a short time horizon can result in signi…cantly di¤erent CARs.
In this paper, we apply econometric theory of the realized beta estimator developed in Reeves and Wu (2013) and Cenesizoglu et al. (2016) . We use this estimator to measure changes in market betas after an in ‡uential macroeconomic event. Speci…cally, we study the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 1 , where we expect to see signi…cant decreases in the systematic risk of …nancial institutions following the announcement.
Although we use market betas as our main measure of systematic risk exposure, we do not (necessarily) assume that the CAPM holds. Changes in market betas are also important in Merton's (1973) ICAPM, for instance, and our event study approach allows for an intercept term to capture constant exposures to state variables. This approach demonstrates that controlling for changes in market betas sourced to the event under study can signi…cantly alter the conclusions drawn on the e¤ects of the event; speci…cally, on whether those e¤ects link (primarily) to idiosyncratic or systematic factors.
Relative to standard event study methodology, our results suggest that when reliable highfrequency data is available, estimation of asset market betas around the event study window using the realized beta estimator o¤ers a more complete decomposition of return deviations and so is a more robust alternative. Use of this estimator in event studies can, thus, be seen as a robustness check. Recent studies to which this robustness check, generally, and this paper's test results, speci…cally, most readily apply include Veronesi and Zingales (2010) and Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) , which both analyze the e¤ects of the TARP announcement on equity returns. In this context, controlling for changes in market betas owed to the TARP announcement is shown to be important when estimating post-event CARs, so as to avoid (potentially) misleading conclusions. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) and Patton and Verardo (2012) , among others). The exact degree of this variation is, itself, associated with healthy variation. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) , posit that market betas stay …xed within a quarter, while Patton and Verardo (2012) assume that market betas change daily. In this paper, we align more with the former, in that we assume that systematic risk exposure, as measured by an asset's market beta, is a (relatively) slow moving process that stays …xed within a time period ranging from approximately twomonths to half a month. The market betas that we estimate are then de…ned as 
where r i;j;T is the simple return earned on asset i over intraday sub-interval j of time period T , and m denotes the market. That is, we estimate an asset's market beta as the ratio between that asset's realized covariance with the market return and the market return's realized variance.
Each realized measure is estimated using a total of S intraday sub-intervals within a given time period, where those time periods are T = f60-days; 30-days; 15-daysg.
To understand the limiting behavior of (1), start by considering (using the notation of Patton and Verardo (2012), Appendix 1) a N 1 vector of risky asset returns d log P (t), where the N th return is the market return, that follows the di¤usion
where d log M (t) is a drift term with …nite variation, W (t) is a standard vector Brownian motion, and (t) is an instantaneous (or spot) covariance matrix of returns. Let
so that
where ICov mm;T = IV m;T , the "integrated" variance of the market return over time period T .
Then by the theory of quadratic variation,
and by Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard (2004, Proposition 2),
where
and b x j;T = r i;j;T r m;j;T b i;T (S) r 2 m;j;T ;
a result that is both empirically feasible and straightforward to implement. We are interested in detecting level shifts in systematic risk exposure by computing the betas in (1) for the 30 components to the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) within symmetric windows (labeled pre and post) around the TARP announcement, where the S&P 500 return proxies for the market return. 2 Regardless of the size of these windows, the pre-event window always ends at the close of the trading on 9/17/08, and the post-event window always begins at the open of trading on 9/19/08. We study the DJIA components because they are all highly liquid and so minimize micro-structure e¤ects and measurement error in the beta estimates.
The intraday sub-period j that we select is 10-minutes, so (1) is computed using 10-minute, simple returns measured between 9:30 AM and 4:00 PM EST each day. 3 All intraday data sources to Price-Data. 4 Let k = fpre; postg. Given (1), we consider b i;T (k; S) and its associated (…nite-sample) variance b 
This test statistic is properly speci…ed asymptotically as S ! 1 since, under the null,
Level shifts in beta, thus, can be detected using a conventional two-sided, di¤erence-in-means test based on the asymptotics developed in Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard (2004).
Potential misspeci…cation
Empirical evidence supports 
Comparing the denominator in (5) to (7), under H 0 and given (6), the test statistic in (5) is biased towards failing to reject (in …nite samples). As a consequence, we consider our testing method to be a conservative gauge for detecting a level shift in beta, owing to this bias. The degree of this bias, however, is relatively muted in the sense that realized beta estimates tend to display (far) less persistence than either the realized covariance or realized variance estimates from which they are constructed (see; e.g., Anderson et al., 2006). Table 1 displays the test results from applying (5) to all 30 DJIA stocks for 60-, 30-, and 15-day windows immediately before and following the TARP announcement. 5 As evidenced in the 5 Owing to the construction of b i;T (S) in (1), econometric analysis of these betas can also follow under the usual p T asymptotics (i.e., in the context of (1), hold S …xed, and let T ! 1). As a consequence, standard errors for b i;T (S) can alternatively be generated according to Newey and West (1987) . Patton and Verardo (2012) apply such asymptotics in their analysis of realized betas. An earlier version of this paper followed a similar tack, with results very similar to those reported in Table 1. table, nearly half of the stocks (14, in particular) experience statistically signi…cant level shifts in beta from the pre-to the post-event windows at a 10% signi…cance level (at least). In light of the discussion in the previous section, these …ndings provide strong evidence supporting level shifts in beta as a result of the TARP announcement. The 60-day window tends to display the smallest p-values because the standard errors tend to be the smallest. As the window size decreases, the standard errors of the beta estimates tend to increase (especially in the post-event window). Signs of the beta di¤erences do not tend to change with the window size, however, and signi…cant di¤erences (at a 10% signi…cance level) are discovered for all window sizes, making the …nding of TARP-induced changes in betas robust.
Empirical analysis of level shifts in beta post-TARP
Consistent with the intent of TARP, …nancial stocks display the most notable level shifts in beta across all window sizes (see AXP, BAC ,GE, and JPM), 6 where these di¤erences are uniformly positive, indicating a decline in the level of systematic risk. In the pre-event window, …nancial stocks have the highest betas across all window sizes of the DJIA components, where (with the exception of GE) these betas are all statistically greater than one. In the post-event window, in contrast (again, with the exception of GE), none of the …nancial stock betas are statistically distinguishable from one. For both the 60-and 30-day windows, beta di¤erences for …nancial stocks are signi…cant at the 1% level. Across these windows, reductions in the betas of Bank of America (BOA) and JPMorgan (JPM), for example, are at (or near) 50%.
Even at the 15-day window, where betas are the most imprecisely estimated, beta di¤erences for …nancial stocks remain signi…cant at the 10% level. In this case, reductions in the betas of BOA and JPM still exceed 30% in absolute value.
Veronesi and Zingales (2010, Table 4 ) report beta estimates for BOA and JPM from a preevent window of 1/1/07-10/9/08 obtained using traditional event study methodology. 7 These estimates are quite comparable to those reported under the 60-day pre-event window in are not good measures for post-event systematic risk exposure, and using them as such in the calculation of traditional CARs can distort the magnitudes of those CARS by multiple orders. Table 1 also evidences signi…cant beta di¤erences for non-…nancial stocks. Relative to …nancial stocks, however, instances of signi…cant beta di¤erences are less robust across window sizes. For instance, only one of the six non-…nancial stocks displaying statistically signi…cant beta di¤erences at the 1% level in the 60-day window continues to display a signi…cant beta di¤erence at the 1% level in the 30-day window. Moreover, none of the six non-…nancial stocks display signi…cant beta di¤erences at a 10% level in the 15-day window.
In general, the direction of shifts in betas correlates with leverage and with TARP bailout funds awarded. The betas of …nancials and levered …rms tend to decrease, while those which are cash rich (negative debt-to-equity ratios) tend to increase. Of the non-…nancial stocks experiencing a statistically signi…cant increase in beta, those evidencing the largest percentage increase tend to be economic bellwethers (e.g., CVX, KO, JNJ, and PG). Consistent with these increases, then, is the TARP announcement signaling a shift of risk from …nancial …rms onto a broader cross-section of …rms. Overall, the prevalence of signi…cant level shifts in beta occurring across components of the DJIA in response to TARP indicates that this policy-event triggered su¢ cient variation in betas to study the impact of these shifts on CARs.
CAR measurements
We now examine the impact of post-announcement level shifts in beta on the estimation of portfolio CARs. Speci…cally, conventional CARs computed using standard event study methodology benchmark CARs reliant upon post-event realized betas that account for level shifts in beta.
The Conventional CARs are computed using the following two approaches:
1. Daily. The market model is estimated for each stock using daily returns over the prior year (250 trading days prior to the announcement) to …t the regression model r i;t = pre;i + pre;i r m;t + i;t ;
where r i;t and r m;t represent the return of stock i and the return on the market index, respectively, earned on day t, and i;t ? r m;t 8 i . Post announcement abnormal returns for stock i are then calculated as AR i;t = r i;t (^ pre;i +^ pre;i r m;t ); so that the post announcement n-day cumulative abnormal return on stock i is
and the post announcement n-day, equally-weighted portfolio CAR is
The Daily approach is the most widely used in the literature. with the post announcement n-day portfolio CAR retaining its de…nition from (8) and (9).
The Daily FF approach has the potential to explain relatively more of the systematic vari- This tendency is accentuated using the Daily FF-based con…dence intervals, which is, of course, consistent with standard errors for FF model CARs being less than or equal to the standard errors for market model CARs. In either case, the con…dence intervals are rather wide, and they comfortably cover both the Daily and Daily FF CARs. Since the HF 21-60 CARs can exist below the lower-bound of these con…dence intervals, CARs measured using realized betas are (quite) di¤erent, in a statistical sense, from CARS measured using standard betas. Moreover, level shifts in betas go a long way in explaining the "abnormally" positive returns earned (mostly) on …nancial stocks following the TARP announcement. It is also interesting to note that on day one, both the HF 21-60 and Daily AR exists above the FF model 95% con…dence interval. It seems, then, that movement in a non-market systematic risk factor explains these apparent "abnormal" returns. As a consequence, even the TARP Up CARs estimated using the HF 21-60 approach display statistically signi…cant departures from the CARS estimated using conventional methods, where these departures are in the direction away from evidencing any "abnormal" returns in the postannouncement window.
Conclusion
We …nd that the systematic risk (measured using market betas) of many stocks in our sample changes following the TARP announcement. We demonstrate that this change can be detected using high-frequency data. We then estimate CARs using various methods. CARs using realized betas (estimated after the event, and after the CAR estimation window) suggest that there was in fact no under-reaction or over-reaction of investors to the TARP event. However, we …nd that standard event study methodologies spuriously generate statistically and economically signi…cant drifts in CARs. Using the market model approach with daily returns (the most widely used in the literature) the spurious drift in CAR was as high as 26.11% on day 16 post announcement. Based on this evidence, we suggest that future event study researchers who …nd large and signi…cant CARs and have access to high-frequency data for their sample consider the possibility of controlling for post-event level shifts in beta using a method similar to the one outlined in this paper. R e a liz e d b e ta s a re e stim a te d w ith in 6 0 -, 3 0 -, a n d 1 5 -d ay w in d ow s p rio r to (p re ) a n d fo llow in g (p o st) th e TA R P a n n o u n c e m e nt, w h ich o c c u rre d o n 9 / 1 8 / 0 8 . T h e d a ta u n d e rly in g a ll re a liz e d b e ta e stim a te s so u rc e s to P ric e -D a ta , o rig in a lly a c c e sse d a t http :/ / w w w .g ra in m a rke tre se a rch .c o m / d jx _ sto ck s.c fm .
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